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This paper explores the nature and the dimensions of legitimacy in the 
international system. In contrast to the philosophically oriented literature on the 
topic, legitimacy is understood here solely as an empirical phenomenon, a 
normative force p ulling state actors towards voluntary compliance with 
international regulations. Referring mainly to insights from social theory and 
legal thinking I conceptualise legitimation of international governance as a 
rational discursive process. In the absence of other legitimating sources such as 
foundatory myths, ideas of providence or a demos, international governance can 
rely only on the legitimating force of rational arguments. International 
governance as governance by agreement draws its legitimation from a consensus 
on normative principles and its translation into issue-specific rules. I then argue 
that the factors that determine the legitimacy of international governance can be 
tentatively divided into three categories: scope of governance, procedural 
fairness, and substantive justice.  
                                                 
1 Jens Steffek. Ph.D. candidate, Department of Social and Political Science, European 
University Institute, Florence, e-mail: steffek@iue.it  
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1. Introduction 
 
Parallel to the rapid growth of supranational institutions and economic 
‘globalisation’ over the last few decades, an extensive debate on the legitimacy 
of governance ‘above the nation state’ has emerged.
2 The central focus of these 
debates lies on the problem of democratic legitimation: how can democratic 
legitimacy be transferred from the single citizen to a remote decision-making 
body on the international level?
3  The democracy-debate, however, leads to a 
somewhat paradoxical situation: on the one hand many arrangements of 
international governance are obviously legitimate in that they are accepted, 
supported and constantly enlarged. On the other hand, there is the impossibility 
to grant the normative predicate ‘legitimate’ to these arrangements. This strand 
of research on international legitimacy has led to a refined understanding of a 
philosophical problem but it cannot provide many new insights as to how the 
process of international legitimation functions in practice. It has no answer to 
the question: why do states support international governance? 
 
Partly in response to this dilemma, philosophers and legal scholars have 
struggled to explore other sources for the legitimacy of international 
governance, mainly the legitimising effect of rational deliberation. International 
governance is viewed as a deliberative process that (ideally) involves all 
relevant interests and can thus make up for the obvious lack of direct democratic 
legitimation. This interesting l iterature tries to derive normative leverage from 
the way international governance actually functions and thus takes an 
ambiguous stance between descriptive and prescriptive perspectives (Joerges 
and Neyer, 1997). On the purely descriptive side of the spectrum, many ‘realist’ 
or ‘rational institutionalist’ scholars are still prone to ignoring the legitimacy 
problem completely and to explaining the shape of international governance 
exclusively in terms of national interests and preferences. International 
legitimacy as a social fact thus slips into a gap between normative research, 
which is preoccupied with the philosophical justification of international 
governance, and empirical research, which tends to dismiss legitimacy as 
irrelevant. 
 
In this essay I propose a re-conceptualisation of the legitimacy 
problematique by re-framing the issue in the Weberian sense. If we regard 
legitimacy as an empirical fact rather than as a normative desideratum we can 
                                                 
2 In this paper I refer to all structures of governance above the nation state as ‘international 
governance’ and corrispondingly to ‘international domination’. This is a bit unfortunate 
because ‘supranational’ brings out better the idea of governance above the nation state. 
However, I prefer to stay in line with this widely used terminology. 
3 Cf. De Burca, 1996; Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1996; Horeth, 1998; Kohler-Koch, 1999; 
Lindseth, 1999; Neyer 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999.  
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observe that international governance is widely viewed as l egitimate, in the 
sense that there are normative motivations for voluntary compliance with it. This 
line of enquiry has been opened up by Thomas Franck (1988, 1995) more than a 
decade ago but withered in the shade of the democratic legitimation debate. One 
of the reasons for this might be that Franck and other authors working in this 
tradition (Hurd, 1999) have quite correctly grasped the dynamics of international 




In this paper I therefore want to provide a solid theoretical grounding for 
an empirically oriented investigation into international legitimacy. I start from 
Max Weber’s assertion that domination in the 20th century is rationally 
legitimised and I try to hammer out the blueprint of discursive legitimation 
which is already present in Weber’s work, but which is often overlooked. Under 
the conditions of enlightened modernity, legitimacy of domination usually 
emerges through a process of rational argumentation. Prescriptions which are 
viewed as legitimate, successfully link shared basic norms and ideas to practice 
type rules. Thus, the legitimacy of modern governance ultimately rests on good 
justifications (Habermas, 1996). 
 
The process of argumentative legitimation can be revised at any time, i.e. 
existing legitimacy can be argumentatively challenged, and the legitimating 
discourse can thus be re-opened. International legitimation can be observed at 
work in what Oran Young has called ‘institutional b argaining’, the 
establishment of new international institutions through negotiations (1989, 
1994). If international institutions are already set, they usually provide a forum 
for debate themselves, the most famous being the General Assembly of the UN, 
which serves as a ‘dispenser’ of collective legitimation and collective 
disapproval on a global level (Claude, 1967).  
 
In the last section of this paper I suggest a tentative typology that 
identifies three main dimensions of international legitimacy. In the l egitimation 
discourse a consensus must be established regarding the scope and means of 
international governance, the fairness of its procedures, and the justice of its 
outcomes. I argue that legitimacy disputes in international relations can be 
meaningfully sorted and analysed according to this typology. Thinking in 
differentiated categories has an advantage over treating legitimacy as a package 
in that it not only allows for a typology, but enables us to spot the sensitive 
points in international governance where the respective dimensions tend to 
                                                 
4 In fact, Franck runs into conceptual difficulties when he introduces state interests to explain 
compliance pull of rules, rather than sticking to rule-inherent factors (cf. Berman, 1991). 
Hurd’s essay quite correctly grasps the function of legitimacy in international affairs but gives 
little indication how legitimacy and legitimation might work in practice.  
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clash. International society, like any other, is founded on partly complementary, 
partly irreconcilable values that by necessity will collide in some situations.  
 
Discursively established legitimacy is therefore p otentially unstable and 
undergoes challenges and revisions. Actors can challenge the legitimacy of 
international governance with respect to one or several of these three dimensions 
and can thus re-initiate the process of discursive legitimation which might lead 
to a completely new institutional arrangement, a revision of existing procedures, 
or might, if the majority of parties concerned do not favour any changes, end in 
a consolidation of the existing governance structures. The recurring moments of 
acute l egitimation crisis open up the opportunity to gain a closer look at the 
legitimacy base of international governance and thus onto the shared values on 
which the international society is built.  
 
2. What is Legitimacy? 
 
Scientific enquiry into the nature and the dimensions of legitimacy is one of the 
oldest tasks of both normative and empirically oriented political science. 
Traditionally, political philosophers have reflected on the conditions under 
which the domination of human beings over others could be called legitimate. 
Legitimacy in this sense is a normative quality that is attributed by philosophers 
to certain social arrangements. In this tradition we might grant the adjective 
‘legitimate’ to structures of governance which have been established in 
accordance with certain rules and principles (which are today mostly democratic 
principles). This is the normative idea of legitimacy. With the rise of empirical 
social science in the early 20
th century a remarkable turn occurred in the 
thinking about legitimacy. Max Weber detached legitimacy from its 
philosophical background and conceptualised it as a social fact: legitimacy is the 
phenomenon that people are willing to accept domination on normative grounds, 
no matter on which specific beliefs this acceptance is grounded. Legitimacy in 
Weber’s sense is the phenomenon that a social order enjoys “the prestige of 
being considered binding” (Weber 1978, 31). 
 
Contrary to the normative variant, legitimacy as an empirical fact reports 
an attitude held by individuals or groups towards domination.
5 In the course of 
this re-conceptualisation the analytical role of norms has shifted significantly. 
Instead of being the philosopher’s yardstick, they have become a sort of 
“independent variable” in a causal relationship, a motivation for social action 
that can be explained by the scientist. As a social scientist in the Weberian 
tradition should abstain from any value-judgement concerning the observations 
                                                 
5 For this distinction see Weber’s polemical remarks on Rudolf Stammler, in Weber, 1978: 
325-333. An excellent introduction into the two versions of legitimacy is provided by 
Beetham, 1991: 3-41.   
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she has made in her empirical work, the study of legitimacy has lost its 
normative status. The tension between the two notions of legitimacy becomes 
presumably clearest in connection with fascist rule. Can fascist domination be 
called ‘legitimate’ if it is accepted and supported by the majority of the 
population? Whereas in the  philosophical sense there is wide room for debate 
(and the answer is likely to be negative), in the strict Weberian sense the answer 
must be positive. Political scientists always seem to have felt very uneasy when 
legitimacy is opened up to a high degree of arbitrariness and random. Can a 
political scientist accept any kind of domination, even if the majority of the 
demos support it?  
 
In recent times we have seen ambitious attempts to reconcile these two 
analytical strands, such as David Beetham’s essay in which he argues that in fact 
democratically legitimised polities are more stable than authoritarian regimes, 
because their mode of legitimation is not only normatively privilegiable but also 
empirically more effective (1991). Although the issue is intriguing I cannot 
engage in these debates here. Given the confusion around the concept of 
‘legitimacy’ and the often rather unclear use of the term in scientific and non-
scientific literature, it nevertheless seems necessary to take a clear stance what 
legitimacy is supposed to mean here.  
 
In this essay I exclusively use a notion of legitimacy that describes an 
empirical fact: the phenomenon that a social order enjoys “the prestige of being 
considered binding” (Weber 1978: 31), and that therefore the ruled-over 
voluntarily accept the domination relationship. To be even more precise: with 
the term legitimacy I describe the fact that people voluntarily accept domination 
on the grounds that they believe in its normative rightfulness.
6 This definition 
rules out possible misconceptions of legitimacy stating that domination will be 
viewed as legitimate if it is materially advantageous to the ruled over. This 
might indeed be an important factor determining acceptance of domination but 
it is not related to legitimacy in the Weberian sense.  
 
As I will describe in more detail below, Weber intended legitimacy to 
describe normative motivations that elicit acceptance without providing material 
incentives, and that help to sustain this acceptance even in cases when material 
burdens are demanded. To be clear, I do not suggest that legitimacy is the only 
factor eliciting  de facto acceptance of domination. I acknowledge that the two 
other classic sources ‘fear’ and ‘interest’ play a significant role in most cases of 
                                                 
6 Note that ‘normative rightfulness’ cannot be equated with the legality of a rule. A rule might 
be codified as law but at the same time be perceived as illegitimate. Similarly, the fact that a 
norm has been established through the prescribed legislative process does not automatically 
guarantee that it will be viewed as legitimate, although this will be more likely (Habermas, 
1996: 29ff). See also section 5 below where different dimensions of legitimacy are identified.  
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rule following (Kratochwil, 1984; Hurd, 1999). To keep the analytical 
distinction we should resort to the term ‘legitimacy’ if, and only if, we want to 
mark a specifically normative motivation for rule-acceptance.  
 
So far my remarks have remained on safe terrain in that such a notion of 
legitimacy is quite common in the social sciences. However, at least among 
international relation scholars it might still elicit raised eyebrows to claim 
legitimacy for domination on the international level. The two doubts one might 
have about this assertion arise from the realist view on international politics 
stating that: 
 
•  there is no international domination to be legitimate in the first place, 
because in the international system there is anarchy; 
 
•  there is no international legitimacy because international domination, if it 
occurs, does not need legitimation. 
 
Both of these objections are tackled in the following sections where I will 
outline an approach to international legitimation. One last caveat is in order 
here: the analysis of i nternational legitimacy I describe in this essay on quite a 
abstract level relates to international relations in general without taking into 
account the special conditions in the European Union (Marks et.al., 1996; 
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 1996). For  normative as well as empirical 
investigation, legitimation patterns in the EU are much more complicated, due to 
the unique characteristics of European multi-level governance. Although I hold 
that the general characteristics of rational-discursive legitimation apply to 
supranational governance in the EU as well, it is not feasible in this essay to 
tackle all the special features of the emerging European polity. 
 
3. International Domination 
 
3.1 The Weberian Notion of Domination: Fragmented and Issue-specific 
 
The argument I want to develop over the following pages starts from the 
assumption that any kind of domination on whatever level of social aggregation 
needs legitimacy in order to be enduring. This can supposed to be true for 
domination on the international level as well (Franck, 1990; Hurd, 1999). The 
notion of domination I have in mind here is based on Max Weber’s definition of 
the term: ““Domination” (Herrschaft) is the probability that a command with a 
given specific content will be obeyed by a given  group of persons” (Weber, 
1978: 53). By introducing the ‘given group of persons’ he apparently does not 
imagine domination as a single, universal structure in the polity  - the 
government dominating and citizens obeying.  
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Secondly, domination for Weber does  not imply that  any  possible 
command will be obeyed by the addressees. Weber’s concept of domination 
rather refers to many different social relationships, including for instance, the 
relation between employer and employee (Weber, 1978: 213). This example is 
useful to bring out the Weberian idea of domination that I want to put forward in 
this essay: an employer can generally count on obedience on the part of the 
employee, but only for a few and clearly defined types of commands. The 
domination of the employer over the employee is clearly restricted to the world 
of work. An employer cannot issue commands concerning the employee’s 
private life with a reasonable expectation of compliance. 
 
Thus domination in the Weberian sense must not be viewed as universal 
and all-encompassing, but rather as sectored and fragmented. Consequently, 
every individual or group is embedded in different, overlapping domination 
relationships, concerning different aspects of their lives. Moreover, the 
Weberian notion of domination does  not require that domination can be 
enforced through coercion mechanisms of the police-type. An employer 
confronted with a recalcitrant worker cannot simply call the police to make the 
employee do as he is told. He has to resort to other means, ranging from 
persuasion over material incentives to material sanctions. In extreme cases the 
only alternative is to terminate the voluntary domination relationship by firing 
the employee. Although other kinds of social domination cannot be terminated 
as easily as a working contract, all sorts of domination are limited with respect 
to time and geographical space and are open to change as far as the range of 
domination and the means of securing obedience are concerned.  
 
3.2 International Domination and the Domestic Analogy 
 
The most encompassing kind of domination we face today is that exercised by 
the state over the citizen, and it is usually this notion of state-citizen domination 
we tend to transplant by analogy to the supranational level when we think about 
international domination. The only authority that can be imagined within the 
boundaries of this analogy is a world government that terminates international 
anarchy.
7 Unfortunately, this domestic analogy which is so often used (and 
abused) in IR fixes our attention  exclusively on political domination in the 
state/citizen context and shadows other possibilities of more issue-specific 
                                                 
7 As the self-understanding of IR as an academic discipline rests to a good deal on the idea 
that there is international anarchy (in contrast to the hierarchical mode of organisation inside 
the state), the anarchy argument is put forward even by some constructivists who see it as sort 
of a quasi-natural organizing principle of the state system. Anarchy as a quasi-natural feature 
of the international system is propelled not only by realists but also by some “constructivist” 
authors such as Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) who try to establish a theory which is 
systemic and “social-constructivist” at the same time.  
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domination. Although it is quite obvious that there is no world government able 
to enforce every single norm and rule, the anarchy metaphor is misleading when 
it comes to the present state of the international system. International 
governance today is at such an advanced stage and has produced such a variety 
and density of regulations that we can justifiably speak of domination structures. 
These domination structures are multiple, issue-specific and by no means all-
encompassing. In many fields international functional regulation to a great 
extent determines already state behaviour in the respective issue area. Since 
disputes catch our attention much more than the cases in which international 
domination functions smoothly, we at times might underestimate its power. 
 
The domestic analogy is misleading because it focuses exclusively on the 
(im)possible creation of a world-state in analogy to an omnipotent nation state, 
which could in its domestic affairs ultimately push through any rule by resorting 
to force. Although it is undoubtedly true that international enforcement 
strategies are weak compared to national enforcement mechanism equipped with 
a functioning police force, it would nevertheless be mistaken to conclude from 
this fact that there is no domination at all in the international system. To 
conclude from the non-existence of a world-state that there must be international 
anarchy hampers the perception of supranational domination structures, which 
do de facto exist. Coercion must not be equated with domination; it is simply 
one aspect of it. In this respect recent legal literature is highly instructive as it 
highlights the manifold possibilities of domination without police-like 
enforcement, particularly at the supranational level (Chayes and Chayes, 1995).  
 
Following Weber, international domination could now be defined as 
follows: “International domination is the probability that specific regulations 
made on the international level will determine respective state actions”. This 
notion of domination is at odds with the domestic analogy because it does not 
suggest (or require) a generalised ability to push through any rule, but envisages 
rather a field - or issue-specific domination and allows for a broad variety of 
non-coercive means to attain rule compliance. The obvious lack of coercive 
capacities makes international domination much more dependent on voluntary 
compliance than governance taking place inside the state. From a functional 
point of view this is rather an argument for than against its legitimacy. However, 
if we keep in mind Weber’s notion of fragmented and multiple domination 
structures it is much easier to see that domination is indeed manifest on the 
supranational level.  
 
All the similarities with private contracting notwithstanding, international 
domination is in many respects clearly different from domination structures 
inside the above-mentioned firm. The principal difference is quite obviously that 
states are makers and receivers of the rules at the same time. In this sense  
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international domination structures resemble those of a co-operative rather than 
those of a private firm, since decisions can only be taken by the members 
themselves, and those members of the co-operative in turn are subject to the 
decisions made. Problems of self-governance in a co-operative resemble the 
structural problems international governance faces  – with the difference that 
states cannot opt out of their co-operative, i.e. the international system. 
Consequently, international domination with a high demand for voluntary 
compliance seems to be highly dependent on the sustained support of the 
governance structures by individual members, too a much higher degree than 
domination inside the state or even inside a firm of the capitalist kind.  
4. Approaching International Legitimacy 
 
4.1 Weber’s Work on Rational Legitimacy 
 
In the preceding sections I have already hinted at the function legitimacy 
performs  in social life. Technically speaking, legitimacy facilitates domination 
by enhancing the probability of non-enforced rule compliance. Max Weber has 
put it this way: 
 
“But custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do 
not f orm a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition there is 
normally a further element, the belief in  legitimacy. Experience shows that in no 
instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual 
or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts 
to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.” (1978: 213)  
 
This is true for any kind of social domination and it is particularly true for 
international relations. Given the strong voluntary element in rule creation and 
rule following in the international system, international domination is even more 
dependent on legitimacy beliefs on the part of the ruled over as any other. 
Before I can go into more detail about the specific characteristics of 
international legitimacy I must inquire more deeply into the  specific type of 
legitimation that generally prevails in modern societies: rational legitimacy. The 
following paragraphs will tackle the question of how legitimacy of domination 
can be established, maintained and challenged under conditions of rational 
legitimation. 
 
As is well known, Max Weber has developed three ideal types of 
legitimate domination or authority ( Herrschaft): traditional, charismatic and 
rational. The first two types, however, are used by Weber mainly to contrast 
with rational legitimacy, which he sees as the prevalent type in modern societies. 
Charismatic as well as traditional authority is not based on equality among 
members of society but on distinctiveness. The “chief” and the normal members 
of society have a completely different status, and it is precisely the distinctive  
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qualities of a chief that make traditional and (even more) charismatic rule 
following possible. The chief’s commands are to be obeyed because she is 
viewed as of divine providence or endowed with extraordinary force and virtue, 
etc.  
 
Such forms of legitimacy presuppose an extreme asymmetry in rights and 
status in the respective society, and by virtue of eliciting obedience preserve the 
asymmetry of the existing order. Traditional chiefs and charismatic leaders are 
themselves not subject to the same rules as the other members of society, the 
commands they issue as binding normally do not bind them themselves. 
Moreover, nobody expects them to feel bound by many of the rules recognised 
as valid by normal members of society. This way traditional and charismatic 
legitimacy not only secures rule following but also reproduces the asymmetric 
status structure of those societies.  
 
Under ideal conditions of rationally legitimated domination, the 
personalised dimension of rule following is completely suspended. Obedience is 
not owed to individual persons but to the rules as such that are usually fixed as 
law. Rational-legal rule is the rule of abstract laws, which generally do not make 
any differences between their subjects; at the very least all exemptions and 
exceptions from the rule require careful justifications. These justifications must 
be argumentatively derived from abstract deliberations with regard to the 
function of the person and its beneficial contribution to society, but not the 
person as such. For example, many modern societies recognize exemptions from 
generally valid laws for certain groups of persons, e.g. for lawyers, priests and 
doctors, but only inasfar as those persons’ professional function is concerned. In 
most democracies, elected politicians enjoy far-reaching exemptions in the sense 
that they are protected by immunity against prosecution. Nevertheless, even this 
immunity can in many countries be renounced, if parliamentary majorities agree. 
As soon as all these persons leave office, parliament etc., their special status 
expires. 
 
In the same way as most exemptions before the law are only temporary 
and are precisely c ircumscribed, the competencies of persons in office are 
clearly defined and delineated. Officials are strictly bound by the text of the law 
and their administrative prescriptions, and the room left for their own 
interpretation is (ideally) very narrow. All the rules they follow are set through a 
prescribed process and written down in a codified form, so that there can be 
little insecurity as to what counts as a valid rule. Of course it may be the case 
that the applicability of an abstract rule to a certain real-world case is doubtful, 
but even these contingencies are normally resolved through a clearly prescribed 
administrative or judicial process. In addition, the application of administrative 
rules is executed regardless of the individual person making claims, and like  
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adjudication, administration should be imagined as blind, not regarding the 
individual characteristics of the person but strictly following abstract rules and 
prescriptions. 
 
To sum up: rational principles together with the rational organisation of 
decision-making procedures in rational institutions form the preconditions for 
rational legitimation. The impersonalised bureaucracy Weber describes is 
perceived as legitimate because it works according to impersonal principles, 
applied in an impersonal way. It is precisely this interplay of the rational 
principles of organisation together with the rational grounding of decisions 
which allows for attaining maximum rationality of rule-setting and rule-
application. In his writings on rational legal rule, Weber elaborates quite 
extensively on the organisational characteristics of modern bureaucracy and the 
status of the civil servant. The aspect I want to examine in this essay, however, 
is not the bureaucratic organisation as such but the rational process of 
justification according to which it works. We should also keep in mind that 
Weber’s account of rational legitimation among formal equals can be applied to 
domination inside the state but also to international society. 
 
4.2 The Importance of ‘Giving Reasons’ 
 
The core principle of rationality in rule-making and  - application is the non-
arbitrariness of the outcome. Non-arbitrariness does not mean that the outcome 
is determined from the beginning, but rather, on the contrary, that the process of 
decision-making is open first and is then narrowed down by different procedural 
moves until (ideally, n.b.) no more than one outcome is possible. The result can 
be called rational if the rational rules of the procedure have been adhered to and 
if alternative outcomes have been ruled out  for good reasons. Given that the 
rules of procedure are fixed (and if rational they are fixed by definition) it seems 
that the good reasons should be of crucial importance to the understanding of 
rational legitimation. In the course of his deliberations about the functioning of 
bureaucratic administration, Weber already highlights the crucial importance of 
“giving reasons” for the modern ways of legitimate decision-making: 
 
“The only decisive point for us is that in principle a system of  rationally debatable 
“reasons” stand behind every act of bureaucratic administration, namely, either 
subsumption under norms, or a weighing of ends and means.” (Weber, 1978: 979; my 
emphasis) 
 
An act of rational rule-making not only must be based on reasons; what is more, 
these reasons must also be “rationally debatable”. Prior to the specific reasons 
one could employ in order to justify a rule is the mechanism of  rational 
justification. The idea of a rational debate obviously implies that the speaker and 
the hearer can meaningfully communicate the reasons on which the decision is  
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based. This mechanism also seems to be specifically modern in that it plays a 
minor role for the functioning of traditional or charismatic domination. Neither 
traditional nor  charismatic rules require extensive communicative justification. 
A person who is emotionally fascinated by the charisma of a leader can hardly 
give sustained reasons for the effect the person exerts on him or her. The 
traditional authority of custom, which is rather felt than argued, remains 
unreflected, and it draws its force precisely from the fact that it remains 
“unquestioned” or even “unquestionable”.  
 
What distinguishes modern rational legitimation is the fact that reasons 
can and must be given for it to succeed, and that these reasons must be open to 
confirmation or disconfirmation in a justificatory discourse. Johannes Weiss has 
persuasively argued that the development of the ability to rationally ask 
questions and to rationally give reasons is the core feature of Weber’s account of 
modernity. In his view, the possibility of rational communication is the 




As Weiss correctly points out, the communicability of reasons is an 
indispensable precondition for many other processes of social rationalisation 
(such as legalisation, bureaucratisation, ethical universalism and 
consequentialism).
9 Communicative potential is the mechanism which enables 
individuals to exchange their views and to communicatively agree on strategies 
of action. This is a formal characteristic in the sense that it does not predict 
which course of action individuals will choose, be it oriented towards material 
or ideal goals. Rational communication is a tool that is universally applicable 
                                                 
8 Rogers Brubaker, for example, counts 16 different notions of rationality (1984: 2). 
9 “Betrachtet man jedoch genauer, was die Praktizierung von Rationalität in allen diesen 
Vorgängen (der einzelnen Aspekte gesellschaftlicher Rationalisierung, J.S.) bedeutet, so wird 
der Sprachgebrauch des Soziologen Weber womoeglich verständlich und plausibel. Immer 
nämlich besteht die Rationalisierung darin, dass das, worauf sie sich richtet, höhere Grade von 
inter-subjektiver Fasslichkeit und (bloss mentaler oder auch praktischer) Reproduzierbarkeit 
annimmt. Dies lässt sich auch so ausdrücken, dass die  –nach Material und Vollzugsweise im 
übrigen sehr verschiedenen- Rationalisierungsprozesse darin übereinkommen, die Sozialität 
bzw. (zumindest) Soziabilität ihrer jeweiligen Gegenstände zu steigern. Dieser 
“vergesellschaftende” Sinn aller Rationalisierungsprozesse bedeutet durchaus nicht, dass 
diese sich auf ein gemeinsames Ziel im Sinne einer vollkommenen, harmonische Sozietät 
zubewegten. Vergesellschaftung heisst in diesem Zusammenhang vielmehr nur, die 
Möglichkeiten der Kommunikation über die betreffenden Objekte in extensiver und / oder in 
intensiver Hinsicht zu entwickeln. Vergesellschaftung in der Form der Rationalisierung 
unterscheidet sich von anderen Formen darin, dass die Verbesserung der Kommunikations- 
und Interaktionsmöglichkeiten über eine explizite Bestimmung, eine  - tendenziell  - 
argumentative (“diskursive”) Begründung und eine  - tendenziell  - konsequente Anwendung 
derjenigen “Prinzipien” und “Regeln” verläuft, welche das menschliche Handeln (im weiten 
Weberschen Sinne) ordnen und leiten.” (Weiss, 1981: 48).  
RSC 2000/46 © 2000 Jens Steffek 
 
14
and may be called second-order rationality. Although Weber did not elaborate 
systematically on the topic of communicability there are some strong hints in 
“Economy and Society” which allow for the assertion that he indeed had such an 
overarching notion of rationality in mind. This seems to be in line with his 
general diagnosis: after the disenchantment of society there are no metaphysical 
resources left which could justify domination. In modernity, classic legitimating 
sources like holiness, providence or divine authority are exhausted, what 
remains is rational argumentative justification.  
 
4.3 Legitimation Through Rational Discourse 
 
This account of modern legitimation through rational discourse which can 
already be seen in the writings of Max Weber was picked up and developed 
much further by Jürgen Habermas.
10 “Max Weber’s concept of legitimate 
authority directs our attention to the connection between belief in the legitimacy 
of orders [Ordnungen] and their potential for justification, on the one hand, and 
to their factual validity on the other.” (Habermas, 1988: 95) For both Weber and 
Habermas, legitimacy is the conceptual place where facts and norms merge, 
where we see the  de facto  validity ( Geltung) of a social order springing from 
shared conviction about the normative validity of values (Gültigkeit). Habermas 
has contributed invaluably to our thinking on rational legitimacy because he 
elaborated further and in great detail on the process of discursive legitimation 
that was only mentioned in passing by Weber, and which in his time could not 
find a systematic place in social theory (Habermas, 1979).  
 
“From these reflections [on the nature of norms, J.S.] it follows that we cannot explain 
the validity claims o f norms without recourse to rationally motivated agreement or at 
least to the conviction that consensus on a recommended norm could be brought about 
with reasons. In that case the model of contracting parties who need know only what 
an imperative means is  quite inadequate. The appropriate model is rather the 
communication community [ Kommunikationsgemeinschaft] of those affected, who as 
participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent 
that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given 
circumstances the proposed norms are ‘right’. The validity claim of norms is grounded 
not in the irrational volitional acts of the contracting parties, but in the rationally 
motivated recognition of norms, which may be questioned at any time.” (Habermas, 
1988: 105) 
 
Analogous to the normative force (validity) of single norms the legitimacy of 
more complex governance systems can be traced back to the two components 
                                                 
10 Note that this assessment is at odds with Habermas’ own interpretation of Weber. In the 
‘Theory of Communicative Action’ (1984), Habermas develops his approach against Weber 
who is portrayed as the proponent of strategic rather than communicative action. Such a 
reading of Weber is definitely too stark and polemical as it deliberately overlooks the initial 
stages of communicative rationality already inherent in Weber’s works.  
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which Habermas outlines here: that they come into being through agreement, 
and that this agreement is based on rational communication. Thus, in principle, 
rational legitimacy emerges through conscious, reflected adherence. People 
accept the validity of a social order by an act of outspoken or silent adherence to 
the values on which it is founded and to the validity of the arguments, which 
link practice type rules to these value principles. This is not to say that every 
single rule needs the explicit acclamation of all people concerned by it in order 
to  attain legitimacy. The point is that every single rule could be justified in 
principle, even if an explicit justification might not be required for a long time. 
The respective argumentative resources are nevertheless always present, even if 
they are not made explicit at a certain point in time.  
 
Under conditions of rational legitimation, purely habit-driven adherence 
to rules that even in principle could not be supported by argumentation is likely 
to break down on the very next occasion when the rule is called into question. 
This becomes clear when we think about the confrontation of rationally 
grounded and non-grounded arguments in a conversation: “we should do x 
because I say so” is obviously on very shaky ground if confronted with a more 
elaborate argument of the type “x should be done because we can attain y this 
way”. We know very well from everyday life that if you cannot give rationally 
accessible reasons for your point it means that you drop out of the discussion.  
 
The only option left to win a point then is the tactical resort to threats or 
positive incentives – which might work indeed in the short run (provided you 
are strong or rich enough) but cannot replace an argumentation accepted as valid 
by others in the long term. But why exactly is ‘because I say so’ such a weak 
argument? The decisive criterion is that it is not presented in a universal, but in a 
personalised form. The speaker of course insinuates to her listeners to agree with 
her proposal but the reasons others could have to do so are special 
characteristics of the speaker: status, credibility, authority, or just power. Thus 
‘because I say so’ can be accepted or refused, but it cannot be challenged by 
counter-arguments. It leads immediately to a communication impasse because it 
cannot be connected to a reason-giving discourse. As this example has shown, 
rational legitimation requires a specific type of rational discourse which only 
acknowledges certain arguments that give reasons in an impersonal, universal 
fashion and are open to counter-arguments at the same time.  
 
Such a discourse also presupposes that speakers take certain attitudes 
towards each other. Connected to his pragmatics of language, Jürgen Habermas 
has explored a set of important preconditions for argumentation, which he calls 
idealisations.
11 These idealisations are often counterfactual constructs, in the 
                                                 
11 See for an accesible statement on this Habermas, 1996: chapter 1.  
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sense that we always assume the existence of these preconditions when we enter 
a conversation, no matter if they are actually present or not. Legitimacy can only 
emerge when t hese conditions are met to a reasonable degree in the 
communication situation, as it requires that the participants adhere to the reasons 
and the reasoning behind the rule, not just to the rule as such.  
 
The counterfactual nature of these idealisations and the taken-for-granted-
ness of its elements mean that they can be pinpointed only in cases where these 
conditions are absent. Instead of explaining the main points on an abstract level, 
I will develop the core conditions from a piece of international negotiation 
literature. My illustration here are Western perceptions of Soviet / Russian 
negotiating behaviour.
  12 Apparently, the ‘Soviet style’ completely contradicted 
what Westerners thought to be ‘normal’ communicative behaviour in 
international negotiations. In a recent article, Hiroshi Kimura (1999) has 
enumerated the main problems Western negotiators encountered when dealing 
with the Soviet/Russian style of negotiating:  
 
1)  the concept of negotiation as a means of social coordination was 
entirely alien to T sarist and Soviet negotiators. The reason for this, 
Kimura suggests, seems to be that Russian culture never had much esteem 
for the idea of equality. Thus, debate among equals was not seen as an 
appropriate method of decision-making. Since social relations were 
viewed as hierarchically structured, commanding and pushing through 
one’s objectives by any means were supposed to be appropriate behaviour 
in social conflict. International negotiations, by analogy, were seen as a 
continuation of war by other means; 
2)  Russian negotiators regularly exasperated their Western 
counterparts by remaining virtually immune to reasoned argument. They 
turned a deaf ear to all attempts of persuasion. In addition, Russian 
negotiators very rarely exposed themselves to critical argument  – by 
simply not putting forward any proposals or initiatives themselves. This 
apparently clashed with a Western presupposition that negotiation 
involves openness and responsiveness to arguments presented by the other 
side; 
3)  According to Kimura, Russian enthusiasm for secrecy has always 
been a notable pattern in their negotiating behaviour. Russian negotiators 
are not only extremely proclusive towards the public but also towards 
their partners on the table. Any supply of information about own positions 
                                                 
12 I am aware of the fact that for Habermas a negotiation situation would not count as case of 
real arguing, since participants  are supposed to have strategic orientations (Habermas 1984, 
Vol.I). However, it has been shown that Habermas’ categorical distinction between 
communicative and strategic orientations of action is in its radicality untenable, see 
Alexander, 1988; Dorschel, 1990 and Greve, 1999.  
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and preferences is seen as a potential disadvantage rather than a way of 
furthering agreement; 
4)  Western observers have been regularly astonished how quickly 
Russian negotiators changed their positions and that they apparently could 
not be bothered with consistency. It was notorious Russian style to make 
180 degree turns overnight without giving any explanation why this 
change happened. Obviously, offers made and positions taken were rather 
a test of the partner’s strength and determination than a proposal for 
agreement. 
 
Against the background of this description it becomes clear what current 
Western, modern culture presupposes when it comes to the exchange of 
arguments on the path to rational decisions or agreements. The core rules are: 
 
1)  acknowledge the others as equals! The Russian despite for co-
operative decision making sprang from rather underdeveloped ideas about 
individuals as equals; 
2)  provide information about facts! It is supposed that a rational 
agreement can be reached only on the basis of agreed facts; 
3)  be open to persuasion! If there are different arguments on the table 
it can be discursively clarified which one is better.  
4)  be sincere and consistent! Offers made should be honest in the 
sense that one should feel bound by them, especially when the other side 
accepts them. 
 
This list covers the main dimensions of what Habermas has called the ideal 
speech situation, which has in this case been almost systematically violated by 
Russian negotiators.
13 To be sure, nobody expects professional negotiators to be 
continously sincere, honest and responsive to new arguments. The 
counterfactual concept of an ideal speech, or rather, ‘negotiation’ situation 
nevertheless shines through here in that massive deviations from a ‘good style’ 
are pointed out. As occasional ‘tricks’ such deviations are tolerated and even 
expected among Western negotiators and surely ‘the art of bargaining’ is to a 
great extent about handling them carefully. Russians negotiators, however, took 
these tricks as their general guidelines.  
 
Of course a sort of ‘agreement’ can be reached even under the most 
adverse bargaining conditions: with a revolver pointing at my chest I am quite 
likely to agree to give my wallet to the mugger. The rational legitimacy base of 
                                                 
13 Another important counterfactual precondition to communication is that ideally only the 
better argument should count and the distribution of power should not determine the outcome 
of the argumentative process. This precondition seems to be somewhat suspended in 
international affairs: actors do obviously not expect this in international negotiations.  
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an agreement reached under such conditions is rather poor, i.e. the force pulling 
towards voluntary compliance with it is at a minimum. Compliance in this case 
will have to rely on carefully crafted reciprocal concession-making (Axelrod, 
1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Oye, 1985).  
 
4.4 The Importance of the Forum: Rule-setting, Rule-revision, and Participation 
 
From the reflections on Weber and Habermas in the previous section it is 
consequent that modern, discursive legitimation needs a certain forum in order 
to function. The publicity of  the forum is again a potentially counterfactual 
assumption: even in negotiations behind closed doors legitimacy-creating 
arguments are the ones that could be repeated in public. So it is not the publicity 
as such which creates legitimacy but the structure of an argument that could be 
presented in public. This is not to say that every inter-state deliberation needs to 
be public in the sense that the press be present: as temporary secrecy is 
indispensable in many bargaining circumstances, the status of ‘publicity’ shifts 
from a real to a counterfactual condition  - the structure of rational political 
argument requires that politically relevant arguments can be formulated only in 
a universalised way, as if they were uttered in public debate.
14  
 
Logrolling, bargaining packages and similar deals might in fact facilitate 
agreement in social conflict but they cannot enhance the legitimacy of an 
agreement. Legitimacy-creating arguments are generalisable and impersonal in 
nature as these are the two key conditions for  presenting them in the public 
forum (Elster, 1986). Legitimation can only be generated through public 
discourse and, similarly, any challenge to already existing legitimacy must enter 
the public discourse first. There is no other way of challenging the existing 
legitimacy of domination in the modern state than through public debate, which 
can in the widest sense of the term demand new rules and functional regimes or 
challenge the legitimacy of existing ones. The decision, however, about concrete 
new rules h as a clearly defined institutional place, in international as well as 
domestic governance. 
 
In representative democracies the institutional place for rule-setting and -
revision is clearly the parliament. Challenges to the legitimacy of the existing 
order can be raised outside the parliament but must be processed within it to 
change this order. International institutions provide an analogous forum, the 
regular conference of the parties or a permanent assembly. Inis Claude has 
highlighted the character of the United Nations’ General Assembly as a forum in 
which legitimation debates take place:  
 
                                                 
14 See also Habermas, 1984, 1996.  
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“While statesmen have their own way of justifying their foreign policies to themselves 
and to their peoples, independently of external judgements, they are well aware  that 
such unilateral determinations do not suffice. They are keenly conscious of the need 
for approval by as large and impressive a body of other states as may be possible, for 
multilateral endorsement of their positions  – in short of collective legitimization.” 
(Claude, 1967: 83) 
 
By virtue of being the most inclusive forum for international legitimation 
debates, open to participation of all states, the General Assembly of the UN is 
the main ‘dispenser of legitimacy’ in the international system. It is also a 
catalyst for (re-) defining the scope of international governance: by organising 
grand conferences on newly emerging topics such as environmental protection, 
demography, gender issues, etc. the UN has regularly provided the forum for a 
discursive process that approved and defined new issues of international 
governance and initiated the process of institutionalisation.  
 
The UN General Assembly is a good example to demonstrate the relation 
between the institutional and discursive dimension of governance. Inclusiveness 
creates repercussions on the argumentative logic in the forum: arguments uttered 
in the General Assembly must be formulated in such a way that all other states 
concerned could agree  – they have to be taken into account. This is precisely 
why  rules created on the UN level are usually viewed as more legitimate than 
rules created on the club-level of the, let us say, G -8. The logic of the big 
audience requires most-inclusive arguments. The applied Kantianism which is 
inherent in Habermas’ theory  of communicative action is mirrored on a very 
practical level in arguing behaviour: the maximum inclusion of the forum 
requires arguments to be formulated in such a way that everybody concerned 
can  - in principle  - agree to them. This is of particular importance for 
international governance which, as self-governance, requires permanent 
consensus-building and is in many cases hostile to majority voting. 
 
International governance emerges from a process of argumentation and is 
mainly formulated in terms of international law. Thus international law can be 
viewed as a discursive consensus that has evolved into legal terminology. 
William Coplin has thoughtfully described international law as “an institutional 
device for communicating to the policy-makers of various states a consensus on 
the nature of the international system.” (1964: 617) By deriving rules of conduct 
from this consensus international law sets the limits and formulates the 
principles of international governance. What is more, and Coplin points this out, 
is that international law not only contains legitimate rules of conduct but also an 
authoritative statement what international relations are like. This is important for  
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what legitimate behaviour is depends on the nature of the social situation, and 
this nature, somewhat paradoxically, is ‘a nature by agreement’.
15  
 
No matter if in respect to regulative rules or authoritative description, the 
binding force of international law is always inseparably connected to the fact 
that it comes into being by agreement (Arend, 1996). This is not to say that it is 
this act of consenting alone that leads to legitimacy. Undoubtedly, the very fact 
of having made a commitment to a rule exerts a force towards feeling bound by 
it  – and be it only for the sake of consistency. Such a position, close to legal 
positivism, cannot explain why certain legal rules are obeyed strictly, whilst 
other rules, which also have a legal character, are neglected and violated without 
eliciting protest or coercion measures. Apparently, the specific content of the 
consent is at least as important as the fact that there was consent when the rule 
was established.  
 
This draws our attention back to one view on international law as 
originating from a deliberative process and deriving its legitimacy and authority 
from it. It exploits a discursive legitimation potential, which is inherent in 
rational processes of deliberation, and thus attains the potential to elicit 
voluntary compliance. That international law does not have the full and 
smoothly functioning enforcement potential of domestic legal systems at its 
disposal is obviously rather an argument in favour of than against its inherent 
legitimacy. The puzzling effect of supranational governance structures is not 
that they are potentially susceptible to defection but that they elicit compliance 
in very many cases despite this (Koh, 1997).  
 
5. The Dimensions of International Legitimacy 
 
5.1 International Governance as Governance by Agreement 
 
Having traced the way from societal modernisation and enlightenment to the 
changes in legitimation patterns in these societies, I have finally argued that the 
specifically modern force of rational-discursive legitimacy is at work on the 
international level as well. With some delay the specifically modern tendency 
towards bureaucratisation and functional differentiation has reached the 
supranational level. In the name of efficient problem-solving, functional 
international organisations tackle an increasing number of problems which 
affect more than one state. This f unctional co-operation has established an 
international functional bureaucracy that is founded on precisely the same 
principles as modern bureaucracy inside the state – the bureaucracy desribed by 
                                                 
15 Alexander Wendt has made the important argument that ‘anarchy’ in the international 
system is a social convention and not a matter of fact, cf. Wendt, 1992, 1999.  
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Weber in Economy and Society. The technique of legitimation that international 
governance employs is exactly the same: linking concrete rules to abstract 
principles, most prominent among them the principles of equality and 
universality, by means of rational argumentation. 
  
International governance is governance b y agreement, i.e. by concluding 
treaties. As I have outlined above, international governance is partial and 
fragmented domination in the sense that not all aspects of state conduct are 
subject to international rule. By signing treaties, states give up only certain 
sovereignty rights, i.e. freedom to pursue whatever policy pleases them in a 
certain issue area, and in many cases they concomitantly set up supranational 
executive bodies. Through a negotiation process they agree on a specific range 
of aims and c ompetencies for the new organisation, on the principles its 
decision-making and executive processes will be based on, and on a scheme of 
sharing costs and benefits which arise from it. Although an international 
organisation is a deus ex machina in the sense that it does not exist before the 
treaty is concluded, many foundatory principles and even more specific rules are 
taken over by analogy from existing institutions. They are not as arbitrary as the 
image of a deus ex machina might suggest.  
 
5.2 Legitimacy and the Scope of International Governance 
 
The first dimension of international legitimacy I want to outline here concerns 
the scope and limits of international governance.
16 International governance can 
only be perceived as legitimate if states agree that certain values should, or can 
only, be realised on an international level. Thus the question is crucial which 
goods should be achieved by international co-operation and which should be left 
to the states own policies (Sinnott, 1995). Here we have to be cautious in order 
not to fall into an explanatory ex-post trap suggesting that certain problems at a 
certain point in time can only be resolved by international co-operation. Which 
problems “can only” be solved by international co-operation is not a matter of 
facts but a matter of agreement. Problems have to be framed as issues which 
require internationally co-ordinated action. If we accept that international 
problems are problems by agreement and therefore always open to 
argumentative challenges, the scope dimension of international legitimacy gains 
contours and shape.  
 
If international co-operation in one issue area is widely viewed as 
necessary and is almost undisputed in principle, we can assume that legitimacy 
in the scope dimension has emerged. There  are cases, however, in which the 
                                                 
16 This dimension of legitimacy is stressed e.g. (with reference to the European Union) by 
Beetham and Lord, 1998.  
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legitimate scope of international governance is hotly debated. Think, for 
example, of the debate whether or not the European Union should handle 
employment policy. In this case, the economic debate about the viability and 
effectiveness of community-wide employment measures is only one of the 
issues under discussion. The other contested point is whether such a sensitive 
issue as employment should be (at least partially) transferred from the discretion 
of national governments to the Union level at all.  
 
As far as the scope of legitimate international governance is concerned we 
can assume that there is a rock bottom of almost “classic” values, which are 
universally acknowledged. This rock bottom is covered by a layer of more 
contested issues which are viewed as legitimate under certain conditions and in 
certain cases. Examples of “classic” international values (which are nowadays 
under erosion) include sovereign conduct and non-interference in domestic 
affairs. These very basic  international values are somewhat rudimentary, i.e. 
they must be and are promoted on an international level but they are values that, 
so to speak, can exist only in the international sphere. The problems they are 
designed to resolve, such as possible interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states, only exist because of the co-existence of different states. Thus the very 
basic values pursued by international co-operation are not transferred to the 
international sphere from the domestic realm but are international values  sui 
generis.  
 
However, since the rise of functional international co-operation in the 
19th century, the face of international governance has changed rapidly: over the 
last one-and-a-half centuries we have seen an unprecedented growth of 
international agreements, tackling issues such as international security, 
communication, international trade, transboundary travelling, environmental 
protection and many more. The fundamental difference with the classic values 
of international governance lies in the nature of the problems addressed on the 
international level. Whereas the very first tasks of international governance have 
been problems that were solely created by the co-existence of different states, 
additional issues have been moved from the domestic to the international level; 
that is to say, problems which were formerly solved on the national level. Many 
of these issues are not yet part of the sediment but still in flux and drift 
according to the  zeitgeist. The tendency of the last few decades seems to 
indicate, however, that the solid sediment is constantly growing in that more and 
more issues are now taken for granted as tasks of international governance, 
including human rights, environmental protection and developmental aid. 
“Taken for g rantedness” is the best indicator of a successful legitimation 
process. 
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One cannot talk about the scope of governance without immediately 
proceeding to its means. Are the specific means of governance, the pathways to 
reach defined goals, a question of legitimacy? In this typology I suggest 
separating the technical questions of efficacy and efficiency of international 
governance from the legitimacy problem. The reasoning behind this is the 
following: legitimacy was defined as a specifically normative urge t o support 
international governance. Thus legitimacy questions are questions of good or 
right conduct, not of goal attainment. 
 
The search for means, in contrast, is in most cases not about rightfulness 
but about efficiency: what is the best way of attaining a desired goal, given the 
scarcity of resources? Continuous failure to reach the declared goals will quite 
likely undermine the acceptance of a rule and create a demand for revision. It is, 
however, not a problem of legitimacy as this is understood in this paper. In 
addition, such a choice can be perfectly well explained by rational 
institutionalist theories focusing on cost-benefit calculations. There is no value 
added by re-labelling efficiency as a legitimacy problem. Having said that, I 
should underline that means of governance can indeed become legitimacy 
problems when they clash with standards of procedural fairness or ethical norms 
regulating international relations. 
 
5.3 Legitimacy and the Process of International Governance 
 
As Max Weber stated in the context of societal modernisation, rationally 
legitimated governance requires a process of decision-making that respects the 
core principles of equality and generalisability. According to Max Weber, 
legitimacy of the legal-rational type means that rules are obeyed because the 
ruled over believe in the correct process of rule-setting and application, i.e. a 
process “within the limits laid down by legal precepts and following principles 
which are capable of generalised formulation and are approved in the order 
governing the group, or at least not disapproved in it.” (Weber, 1978: 217)  
 
There is hardly any other realm of social life where this could be more 
true than in international politics. The making and application of international 
rules and decisions is clearly prescribed and usually carefully obeyed. In this 
section I will concentrate on these formal, procedural aspects of international 
legitimacy, which basically means on right process in accordance with the 
principles guiding the setting and application of international norms by states 
and international organisations. Since there is a remarkable number of 
approved principles in international society which guide the conduct of 
international affairs, it can be assumed that legitimate international rule-setting 
and application must be in accordance with these prescriptions. 
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Here I must refer to the seminal work of Thomas Franck since it provides 
an excellent enquiry into some conditions under which governance will be 
viewed as legitimate in the international sphere (1990).
17 For Franck, legitimacy 
is “the quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of those to 
whom it is addressed that it has come into being with right process” (1988: 706) 
One very important factor of right process is  determinacy: the text of the 
international rule has to convey a clear message. If a rule prescribes exactly 
what will happen under certain circumstances, compliance will be more likely 
than in the case of an indeterminate or unclear prescription. Another f actor 
concerns the application of rules: to guarantee perceived fairness rules should be 
applied coherently rather than inconsistently, or on an unclear case-to-case basis. 
 
A third important factor is the adherence of a single rule to more general 
systems of legal principles. For example, today it is widely accepted that the 
General Assembly of the United Nations is organised according to the principle 
'one state - one vote'. To see the significance of this argument we should keep in 
mind that other criteria for organising the process of international governance 
are also available. Why not weigh states' votes according to size, population or 
economic power? The procedure of 'one state - one vote' is consistent with the 
overarching principle of state equality that is so prominent in the UN system. 
Therefore, it can be argued, one state - one vote is the only legitimate mode of 
voting in the General Assembly of the UN.
18 
 
International governance, as Franck rightly points out, has to adhere to the 
accepted standards of international law and custom to be seen as legitimate. By 
concentrating on the constellation of interests as their core variable, rationalist 
scholars have widely neglected this aspect of international co-operation. Another 
lesson that Franck teaches us, is that rules cannot be invented ad hoc, or as 
seems appropriate to reach an “optimal” solution for a problem. Every newly 
emerging norm has to be viewed in the context of already existing norms and 
more general principles underlying the international order.  
 
5.4 Legitimacy and Justice in International Relations 
 
However, the trouble with Franck’s work is that it concentrates overly on the 
formal characteristics of rules and thus takes no account of other factors which, 
at least in my view, significantly influence the perceived legitimacy of the rule 
in question. The problem of scope has already been mentioned. Another issue 
                                                 
17 One criterion I leave out here is ‘symbolic validation’ as it transcends the f ormal and 
rational character of legitimacy: the authority of symbols, which Franck insinuates is at odds 
with the rational reasoning underlying his notion of ‘right process’. 
18 For the legitmation of the divergent mode of voting in the Security Council and the tension 
between the two principles see Koskenniemi, 1995.  
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that clearly affects the perceived legitimacy of governance besides the fairness 
of procedures is substantive justice of outcomes. In Franck’s work “justice” is 
quite awkwardly detached from legitimacy and is conceptualised as a separate 
factor of normatively motivated rule compliance (1995). In the light of Weber’s 
definition it is hard to find a compelling reason why ‘legitimacy’ should refer 
only to right process and exclude substantive criteria which in practice might 
equally affect a state’s willingness to accept international governance.
19 If 
legitimacy is a normative force urging states to comply with international rules 
why should it only be a question of right process? Legitimacy as a social force 
clearly transcends formal characteristics and regards the output dimension of 
governance as well.  
 
The history of the 20
th century indeed provides a good example of an 
international legitimation crisis that revolved around the ‘output’ of global 
governance rather than the procedures. At the beginning of the 1960s developing 
countries started to revolt against the liberal international economic order 
claiming that the  Bretton Woods Institutions worked in favour of the 
industrialised countries. In their view, international market allocation caused 
growing disparity of incomes since the starting positions of the competitors were 
uneven. International governance should therefore intervene into the global 
market and make sure that developing countries received a ‘fair share’ of world 
trade.  
 
Thus the legitimation crisis in the 1960s and 70s was not fought about 
procedural fairness but mainly about questions of distributive justice: after the 
dawn of the colonial empires, formal equality among states was reached in 
international relations. What the developing world demanded, was substantial 
equality. Therefore a third set of factors should be introduced into the categories, 
factors which are normative but not procedural in nature. The justice dimension 
as I think of it here, concerns the consequences of international governance. If 
the world trade regime is criticised for producing unjust allocations of wealth, 
this is such an outcome problem.  
 
As every kind of international governance has distributive consequences, 
quarrels about the criteria for distribution occurr quite regularly. The amounts of 
money involved may sometimes be marginal, but in the vast majority of cases 
they are quite significant. Distributive effects from international cooperation are 
twofold: on the one hand, every cooperative agreement that leads to the 
establishment of a (more or less costly) institutional structure  directly causes 
financial burdens to be shared among the participants. On the other hand, 
                                                 
19 In his writings on legitimacy Thomas Franck (1988: 708ff.) explicitely invokes the 
Weberian and Habermasian notion of legitimacy. As I have demonstrated above neither of 
them seems to have advocated a purely formal approach to legitimacy similar to Franck’s.  
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specific provisions in international agreements have indirect distributive 
consequences which are in many cases hard to calculate beforehand. An 
agreement on generalised tariff reductions, for instance, may favour highly 
competitive national economies over less developed ones and, to make the 
picture even more complicated, specific economic sectors inside countries over 
others. Consequently, the economic performance of the participating countries is 
severely affected b y international trade rules. Benefits from international 
cooperation are normally distributed unequally and much harder to control than 
direct financial burdens. 
 
The justice dimension of international governance is largely, but not 
exclusively, about distribution of material wealth.  It can also concern many 
types of more or less unintended consequences of international governance. If 
international development aid leads to environmental damage, increases regional 
migration or gender inequalities, this may b e considered as an outcome 
problems as well. Notorious are the many instances in which international 
governance has failed to intervene in processes which are clearly within its 
regulation competence  – with ethically devastating consequences. The lethargy 
of the UN faced with the civil war in Rwanda is a case in point, the incapacity to 
prevent the genocide in Bosnia is another. These outcomes of failed 
international governance are perceived as morally unjust and in many cases lead 
to a re-opening of the debate on the appropriate scope of international 
governance. They also direct the attention back to the first dimension of 
international governance: if international institutions claim to be in charge of 
keeping the peace, they are also perceived to be responsible for it.  
 
5.5 On the Use and Limits of these Categories 
 
This example now points to the interrelations between the three spheres of 
legitimacy, which were presented as different for analytical purposes. The 
typology I have outlined here is intended  to facilitate the analysis of 
argumentative processes in international relations by delivering categories to 
keep certain realms of normative problems distinct. However, this typology does 
not suggest that every issue-specific international discourse must fall exclusively 
into one of these categories. Given the complexity of the political problems on 
the international agenda it should rather be the rule than the exception that 
discourses touch all these fields in one way or the other. This should not be seen 
as a disadvantage since the typology can help to identify certain phases in the 
discourse in which aspect 1,2, or 3 prevailed. This also refers to long-term 
developments: whereas, I would suggest, the years after World War II saw 
debates on the scope and procedures of legitimate international governance, the 
focus in the 1960s clearly shifted to the distributive dimension. Thus it seems to 
be rather likely that in creating a policy for a specific target, debates on scope  
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(What should be done?) and boundaries (How far should we go?) alternate with 
debates on procedural questions (Who can participate? What should concrete 
procedures look like?) and deliberations on justice (Who should pay the cost? 
Should we make exceptions and if so, on what grounds?). 
 
Therefore the three dimensions have to be envisaged as interacting rather 
than separated. For example, norms of distributive justice and procedural 
fairness can interact in the sense that deviations from the principle of equality 
are made to adjust the outcome in a way that is perceived as sound. Preferential 
treatment for developing countries in the world trade system is a case in point 
here. Whereas trade rules are universal in the sense that their prescriptions apply 
equally to all states in principle, certain countries enjoy special treatment since 
they are supposedly not competitive. Thus, de facto inequality is countered with 
normative inequality. In a historical view on the subject one can also remark 
interactions between the scope and the ethical dimension. It was one of the 
major questions in the 1960s if concerns of development should be tackled at all 
by the international trade and finance institutions.
20 In more recent years similar 
developments are visible in the attempt to “green” the world trade and finance 
system, and to include ecological sustainability in the agenda of the respective 




In this essay I have outlined the nature and main dimensions of international 
legitimacy, understood as an empirical fact. Legitimacy is a force that pulls state 
actors towards voluntary compliance with international regulation. Drawing on 
the works of Weber and Habermas I also have shown that this de facto 
legitimacy of governance in the present international system is established and 
challenged discursively. It is built on arguments that have the capacity to 
successfully link shared values of the international community to practice type 
regulations. Legitimacy comes into being by collective adherence to these 
arguments. The circumstances under which such a legitimating consensus can be 
reached are anything but arbitrary: legitimacy can only be produced in a 
discursive environment that fulfils some basic conditions like the 
acknowledgement of equality, that parties abstain from threats, and that they are 
not only arguing themselves but are prepared to acknowledge and reflect other 
views. 
 
Since it is not based on any transcendental or mythological foundations, 
international legitimacy probably is the purest type of rational  legitimacy we 
know. That it is such a clear-cut example does, of course, not imply that 
                                                 
20 Cf. Chapter 4 in Finnemore, 1996.  
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international politics, or international policy makers, are particularly modern or 
rational. It is rather due to the fact that all other possible sources of legitimacy 
that a normal nation-state can rely on are absent on the international level. 
International legitimacy cannot draw its legitimating force from metaphysical 
symbols and foundatory myths, from alleged providence or the will of a demos. 
It relies solely on the sober power of reason and good arguments, and thus it is 
as potentially unstable as it is specifically modern.  
 
Three sets of factors have been identified that determine the perceived 
legitimacy of international governance: an agreed scope of competence, fairness 
of procedures, and justice of outcomes. In principle this is true for governance 
inside the modern state as well. A nation-state, however, has other sources of 
legitimacy at its disposal and thus attains a specific legitimation mix between 
purely rational and ‘irrational’ elements. In particular, national governments can 
exploit the individual’s feeling of belonging to an imagined community that is 
represented by them. In this connection it is interesting that supranational bodies 
like the EU try to create such feelings of belonging by invoking a common 
European culture and European values. Grounded on functional reasoning, 
international governance is an extremely rational form of domination. This is its 
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